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Cooperation Act of 1990: Increasing 
International Cooperation in 
Extraterritorial Discovery? 
INTRODUCTION 
With the globalization of financial markets and the advent of 
world-wide telecommunications, the international trade of secu-
rities has become a frequent and important aspect of business. 
The United States, whose laws in the area of securities are among 
the most sophisticated in the world, has sought to regulate effec-
tively these securities transactions. Congress's latest step toward 
that goal was the enactment of the International Securities En-
forcement Cooperation Act of 1990 (ISECA).I 
United States courts have often been called upon to enforce 
U.S. securities laws over foreign individuals and foreign trans-
actions bearing a connection to the United States.2 In so doing, 
however, the courts have frequently given little weight to princi-
ples of international law and comity.3 This has caused the United 
States problems in asserting jurisdiction, and carrying out and 
enforcing discovery in international securities cases.4 
These problems have been particularly acute during the dis-
covery phase of any resulting litigation.5 Conflicts of law problems 
have arisen where parties to a lawsuit in a U.S. court have sought 
production of documents held in a foreign country and subject 
to foreign non-disclosure laws.6 In attempting to address this 
I See International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
550,104 Stat. 2714 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.c. (Supp. 1991» 
[hereinafter ISECA). 
2 See Ronald E. Bornstein & N. Elaine Dugger, International Regulation of Insider Trading, 
2 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 375, 398-400 (1987). 
3 Silvia B. Piftera-Vazquez, Comment, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction and International Bank-
ing: A Conflict of Interests, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 449, 483-89 (1988). 
4 Id. 
5 See Bornstein & Dugger, supra note 2, at 396, 412. 
6 William B. Haseltine, International Regulation of Securities Markets: Interaction Between 
United States and Foreign Laws, 36 INT'L & COMPo L. Q. 307, 322-28 (1987). 
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issue, U.S. courts have fashioned different tests to determine 
whether U.S. law or foreign law should apply in a given case.7 
The often arbitrary and conflicting decisions of the different 
circuits have not only caused friction between the United States 
and other countries, but have impeded the enforcement of inter-
national securities transactions by the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC).s 
The SEC has turned to mutual assistance treaties, inter-agency 
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), and various other en-
forcement agreements to better address extraterritorial violations 
of U.S. securities lawsY These arrangements have proven helpful 
and removed many obstacles to the SEC's international enforce-
ment of U.S. securities laws. There are, however, limitations to 
the negotiation and enforcement of such instruments. 10 Through 
ISECA, Congress has enabled the SEC to address more ade-
quately the deficiencies of the aforementioned enforcement 
agreements. I I 
ISECA grants the SEC significant discretion in maintaining the 
confidentiality of foreign documents and disclosing confidential 
U.S. documents to foreign securities agencies and governments. 12 
It also expands the SEC's ability to limit the securities activities 
of individuals based on the judgment of a foreign court. 13 Con-
gress gave the SEC these new powers to foster cooperation be-
tween the SEC and its foreign counterparts in the area of secu-
rities law enforcement. Thus, through ISECA, Congress hoped 
to facilitate extraterritorial discovery in U.S. securities cases. 
This Comment examines ISECA and whether it is an adequate 
response to the problem of evidence-gathering in international 
securities cases. Part I of this Comment examines the existing 
case law on evidence-gathering in international securities cases, 
and how the courts have handled discovery in the absence of 
explicit legislative guidance. Part II introduces MOUs and other 
enforcement agreements the SEC has entered into in response 
to discovery problems. Part III discusses ISECA and whether it 
7 Seeid.at3I7-22. 
8 See id. at 326-2S. 
9 See Bornstein & Dugger, supra note 2, at 413-17. 
10 [d. at 413,415. 
11 See generally ISECA, supra note 1. 
12 IS V.S.C.A. §§ 7Sx, SOa-44, SOb-lOb (West Supp. 1991). 
13 [d. §§ 7So(b), SOa(9)(b). 
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adequately supplements the agreements examined in Part II. 
This Comment concludes that while ISECA will promote inter-
national cooperation in evidence-gathering in U.S. securities 
cases, the United States should place more emphasis on a multi-
national approach to the issue. 
I. EVIDENCE GATHERING IN TRANSNATIONAL SEC 
INVESTIGATIONS AND SECURITIES CASES 
A. Procedure 
United States SeCUrItIes laws impose a duty on the SEC to 
investigate complaints and other indications of violations of se-
curities laws. 14 Investigations are usually undertaken by the ap-
propriate enforcement division. IS During an investigation, the 
SEC may issue subpoenas requiring sworn testimony and pro-
duction of documents and records pertinent to the investigated 
matter. 16 This subpoena power may be enforced by an Order of 
Compliance if the requested party refuses to comply.17 When an 
investigation reveals a possible violation of a securities law, the 
SEC can seek a civil injunction in a federal district court to pro-
hibit the alleged violation,18 or commence an administrative pro-
ceeding. 19 
The SEC, however, has only civil authority. When an investi-
gation indicates a criminal violation, the SEC can only refer the 
facts of the investigation to the Department of Justice with a 
recommendation for prosecution of the violators.2o The U.S. At-
14 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-7811, 78u (West Supp. 
1991) [hereinafter SEA]; RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REG-
ULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 52-53 (1987). The SEA defines "securities laws" to include: 
the Securities Act of 1933; the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935; the Trust Indenture Act of 1939; the Investment Company Act 
of 1940; the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; and the Securities Investor Protection Act 
of 1970. SEA, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(47). 
l5 JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 14, at 52. 
16 [d. at 53. 
17 [d. at 55. 
18 [d. 
19 [d. at 54. After such a hearing, the SEC may take specific action, including revocation, 
expulsion, and censure of the securities activities of an individual. Hearings are held 
before an SEC-appointed Administrative Law Judge, and may be reviewed by the SEC. 
The law permits any party to the hearing to appeal the decision of the SEC in the 
appropriate U.S. Court of Appeals. [d. at 54-55. 
20 [d. at 55. 
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tomey may then use evidence arising from the investigation to 
seek a federal grand jury indictment.2! 
Although these procedures are straightforward for domestic 
investigations and cases, many problems arise once the SEC at-
tempts to apply them extraterritorially.22 The securities laws con-
tain no provisions governing extraterritorial evidence-gathering 
during SEC investigations or the discovery period of securities 
cases.23 In response, U.S. courts have established tests to deter-
mine when requested foreign-based evidence is subject to discov-
ery or investigation. 24 
B. Blocking and Secrecy Laws 
The SEC, through its investigative powers or during litigation, 
often requests information from foreign jurisdictions concerning 
the identities and assets of persons who have allegedly violated 
U.S. securities laws. Foreign governments often resist such re-
quests through their own laws,25 often in the form of blocking 
and secrecy laws.26 
Blocking laws generally prohibit the disclosure, copying, in-
spection, or removal of documents located in the foreign juris-
diction.27 Foreign governments often punish violations of block-
ing laws with criminal sanctions.28 Some blocking laws operate 
21 Id. 
22 Haseltine, supra note 6, at 312. 
23 See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm; SEA, 15 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 78a-78u; Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79a-z-6; Trust 
Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-78bbbb; Investment Company Act of 1940, 
15 U.S.C. § 80a(l)-(64); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b(l)-(21); and 
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 u.s.c. §§ 78aaa-78111. 
24 See, e.g., United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384, 1388-90 (11th Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983) [hereinafter Nova Scotia I); In re Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 997-99 (10th Cir. 1977); SEC v. 
Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. Ill, 117-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
25 Haseltine, supra note 6, at 312-14. Occasionally foreign countries lack equivalents to 
U.S. laws. An example of the incompatibility of U.S. and foreign laws is the failure of 
many countries to enforce their own insider trading laws. This failure prevents the SEC 
from seeking evidence under dual criminality treaties, which require evidence sought by 
one jurisdiction from another to relate to a crime punishable in both jurisdictions. Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id.at313. 
28 See JoAnn M. Navickas, Swiss Banks and Insider Trading in the United States, 2 INT'L 
TAX & Bus. L. 159, 166 (1984). 
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automatically to prevent the release of information to a foreign 
requesting state under certain circumstances.29 A French statute, 
for example, prohibits disclosure or use of certain information 
absent authorization. 3D Other blocking laws' prohibitions are ap-
plied only when a representative of the host jurisdiction invokes 
them to prevent disclosure to the requesting authority.31 These 
laws protect the host jurisdiction's national interests.32 Conse-
quently, private parties generally cannot waive prohibitions 
against disclosure.33 
Secrecy laws are intended to protect individual rights to privacy, 
as well as broader national interests.34 Individuals may waive these 
rights. 35 An enacting government, however, will not grant a 
waiver if it feels that disclosure of certain information is detri-
mental to its national interest.36 
Secrecy laws are common in banking; they prohibit banks in 
the host jurisdiction from disclosing information concerning their 
clients.37 If banking secrecy laws are designed to protect a private 
interest in the confidentiality of information, rather than the 
public interest, they generally may be waived by bank customers. 
Customers may waive the confidentiality of information as long 
as the bank does not breach its duty to a third party.38 Switzerland 
29 Bornstein & Dugger, supra note 2, at 410. 
30 Harvey M. Silets & Susan W. Brenner, "Compelled Consent"; An Oxymoron with Sinister 
Consequence for People who Patronize Foreign Banking Institutions, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L 
L. 435, 442 (1988). France enacted its blocking statute on July 16, 1980. It contains four 
sections. The first section prohibits French nationals from disclosing to a foreign entity 
any information which might impair France's sovereignty, security, or economic interests. 
The second section requires anyone seeking to disclose information to do so through 
means prescribed by French law. The third section requires any person within the scope 
of the first two sections to notify the "competent" French minister of any request for 
information. The last section sets out the applicable criminal sanctions in case of a violation 
of the statute. Id. at 442 n. 21. 
31 Bornstein & Dugger, supra note 2, at 410. 
32 Silets & Brenner, supra note 30, at 442 n.21. The French blocking statute was adopted 
to protect French interests from abusive foreign discovery procedures and excessive 
assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction, particularly by U.S. courts. 
33 See Bornstein & Dugger, supra note 2, at 410. 
34 Id. 
35 !d. at 410-12. 
36 Haseltine, supra note 6, at 314. 
37 Bornstein & Dugger, supra note 2, at 411. Such information may take the form of 
records of transactions, customer identification, or customer account numbers. 
38 !d. 
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is well known for its strict bank secrecy laws,39 which provide for 
criminal sanctions in the event of a violation.40 
Foreign bank secrecy laws also directly affect SEC investigations 
and oversight. Foreign banks do not fall under the restrictions 
of the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibits U.S. commercial banks 
from dealing in securities, including the purchase, sale, and un-
derwriting of most stoCk.41 Therefore, foreign banks may engage 
in securities transactions as agents, as broker-dealers, and in cer-
tain cases, as underwriters for their clients. 
C. United States Approach to Conflicts of Law Problems 
1. SEC Action 
The SEC's Division of Enforcement attempted to resolve the 
problem secrecy laws pose by proposing "a waiver by conduct" 
rule in 1984.42 Under the proposed rule, any person effecting a 
purchase or sale of securities in the United States was deemed to 
have consented to disclosure of relevant evidence in any pro-
ceeding or investigation arising out of the transaction.43 Critics 
described the proposal as incompatible with international law, as 
well as ineffective in countries with bank secrecy laws.44 As a 
result, the proposed rule was eventually abandoned.45 
39 Silets & Brenner, supra note 30, at 443-48. The Swiss government enacted its Banking 
Act to protect the assets of persecuted Jews from the German Nazi government during 
the 1930s. The Act prohibits the disclosure of customer transactions, and of bank com-
munications with its customers and others regarding those transactions. Violation of the 
statute is a criminal as well as a civil offense. Under certain circumstances, however, a 
bank may be relieved of its secrecy obligation. Bank customers may waive their banking 
secrecy protections or the bank may be compelled by a competent government authority 
to disclose the protected information. In either case, the bank may be legally directed to 
disclose protected information to the government or third parties. Id. 
40 See Bundesgesetz uber die Banken und Sparkassen of Nov. 8, 1934, art. 47, AS 808, 
RO 808, RU 808 (Swiss Banking Law). Antigua, the Bahamas, Barbados, the Cayman 
Islands, Luxembourg, Panama and Singapore also have strict banking secrecy laws which 
have transformed them into some of the largest money havens in the world. Silets & 
Brenner, supra note 30, at 445-47 n.29. 
41 Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act) §§ 16,20,21,32; 12 U.S.C §§ 24, 78, 377, 
378 (1988). 
42 Fedders Asks Congress for Legislation to Impose Waiver by Conduct Standard, [1984 Transfer 
Binder] 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 602 (Apr. 6, 1984); see Haseltine, supra 
note 6, at 310. 
43 SEC's Waiver-By-Conduct Proposal Meets Strong Wave of Foreign, U.S. Opposition, [1985 
Transfer Binder] 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.7, at 291 (Feb. IS, 1985). 
44 Id. at 292. 
45 See Bornstein & Dugger, supra note 2, at 411. 
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2. Judicial Solutions 
In dealing with foreign obstacles to extraterritorial discovery, 
U.S. courts have most often resolved conflicts between domestic 
and foreign law in favor of the former. 46 The courts have rea-
soned that the SEC's need for specific information to pursue 
possible violators of securities laws outweighs the restrictive pur-
pose of conflicting foreign law. The courts have felt that such 
foreign law only reflects a general policy against cooperation with 
other statesY The U.S. judicial favoritism toward domestic law, 
however, has not always led to disclosure of the requested infor-
mation. Rather, it has often offended the sovereign rights of the 
foreign states involved.48 
In general, there is no uniform test applied throughout the 
U.S. circuit courts for determining whether foreign blocking and 
secrecy laws should prevent extraterritorial discovery. Most circuit 
court decisions, however, use or refer to two standards: (1) the 
"good faith" test developed by the Supreme Court in Societe In-
ternationale v. Rogers;49 and (2) the factor analysis test based on 
the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations (Restatement).5o 
In Societe Internationale, the Supreme Court addressed the issue 
of whether sanctions were appropriate where the plaintiff had 
failed to comply with a discovery request for documents on the 
grounds that doing so would violate Swiss banking law.5l The 
46 Michael D. Mann & Joseph G. Mari, Developments in International Securities Law 
Enforcement and Regulation 34 (Oct. 24, 1990) (SEC Securities Regulation Seminar 
document, unpublished manuscript, on file with the Boston College International and Com-
parative Law Review). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) delineate federal 
courts' discovery powers. Rules 26-37 of the FRCP address the general category of 
"depositions and discovery." Under these rules, the parties may act independently of the 
court in carrying out their discovery as long as they follow procedural guidelines. Al-
though discovery may be initiated and completed without dispute by the parties, Rule 37 
provides for enforcement by a court in the event that a party fails to comply with a 
discovery request. Sanctions may also be imposed for non-compliance with a discovery 
request. FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37. 
47 Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 32. 
48 See Pifiera-Vazquez, supra note 3, at 482-84. 
49 357 U.S. 197,208-12 (1958). 
50 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 40 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND)]. 
51 357 U.S. at 200. A Swiss holding company brought suit in the United States under 
the Trading with the Enemy Act, seeking the return of property seized by the Alien 
Property Custodian during World War II. The plaintiff was required to produce certain 
documents and records pursuant to a discovery request in a U.S. court. The plaintiff 
refused to comply on the grounds that doing so would violate Swiss penal law. The 
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Supreme Court resolved the issue by determining that the plain-
tiff had made a full effort to comply with the discovery request. 52 
The plaintiff demonstrated that disclosure would violate Swiss 
secrecy laws and that Switzerland had a strong interest in enforc-
ing its secrecy laws. Therefore, the Court found that the plaintiff 
had not acted in bad faith and that the case should proceed. 53 
The Court further held that U.S. courts may not use such harsh 
sanctions as dismissal with prejudice absent extreme circum-
stances.54 
In addition to the good faith test, the courts have used the 
factor analysis approach set forth in section 40 of the Restate-
ment.55 The section 40 factors most commonly referred to by 
courts include: (1) the national interests of each nation involved; 
(2) the comparative hardship placed on the parties; and (3) a 
good faith showing that criminal sanctions will result from com-
pliance with U.S. discovery orders.56 
question before the Supreme Court was whether sanctions against the plaintiff for failing 
to produce the records would be appropriate. Id. at 198-203. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 212. 
55 See, e.g., Nova Scotia 1,691 F.2d 1389-90 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 
(1983); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 997 (10th 
Cir. 1977); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 117-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) lists the following factors that should be used in 
determining whether a foreign source should comply with a court order for discovery: 
(a) the vital national interests of each of the states; (b) the extent and nature of the 
hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person; (c) the 
extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of another state; (d) 
the nationality of the person; and (e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either 
state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that 
state. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 50, § 40. 
The Restatement (Second) was revised in 1987 to include an expanded and more 
detailed factor analysis for the conflict oflaws question. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. Due to its relatively recent adop-
tion, however, courts have not referred to the Restatement (Third) as much as the 
Restatement (Second). The Restatement (Third) goes beyond the § 40 analysis and offers 
a more detailed approach; three sections are relevant in addressing a conflict of laws 
problem. Section 403 of the Restatement (Third) addresses the limitations on a court's 
jurisdiction to prescribe domestic law abroad, and emphasizes reasonableness. Section 441 
addresses the defense of foreign state compulsion in relation to activities generally. Finally, 
§ 442 sets forth U.S. law on foreign state compulsion when requests for the disclosure of 
information located in one country is sought in connection with a legal proceeding in 
another. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra, §§ 403, 441, 442. 
56 See Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1389-90; Westinghouse, 563 F.2d at 997; Banca Della 
Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. at 117-19. 
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Since Societe Internationale, the circuit courts have used the good 
faith test and the Restatement analysis among other factors in 
their decisions. 57 The Second Circuit, for example, has estab-
lished a method of analysis concerning production orders di-
rected at a plaintiff or witness.58 The court orders production 
when foreign secrecy laws appear to be used as a shield for 
criminal activity. 59 The Second Circuit's test also considers a par-
ty's good faith, competing national interests, and principles of 
international comity.60 
The D.C. Circuit has followed the Second Circuit's approach 
closely. The D.C. Circuit has explicitly recognized the interna-
tional ramifications of compliance and given foreign interests 
more serious consideration.61 The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Cir-
cuits have applied the Second Circuit method and the Restate-
ment factors similarly.62 
57 See, e.g., In re Sealed, 825 F.2d 494, 497-98 (D.C. Cir.), urt. denied, 108 S. Ct. 451 
(1987); Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1389-90; Westinghouse, 563 F.2d at 997-98. 
58 See United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1033-36 (2d Cir. 1985). During an 
investigation by the U.S. government, the defendant was served with a subpoena request-
ing certain documents which were located in a bank in the Cayman Islands. The defendant 
refused to comply asserting that the bank would be subject to criminal prosecution in the 
Cayman Islands for violating its secrecy laws. !d. at 1033. See also United States v. First 
National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 901-03 (2d Cir. 1968). In First National, the appeals 
court affirmed the district court's order enforcing an antitrust grand jury subpoena 
seeking documents located in the United States and Germany. Id. at 905. The defendant 
refused to comply arguing that to do so would violate German secrecy requirements in 
contract and tort law. Id. at 899. The court reasoned that because the defendant had 
chosen to place its records in a foreign state, where it might be exposed to adverse civil 
consequences, it must accept being subject to criminal discovery in the United States as 
well. Id. at 904-05. 
59 Davis, 767 F.2d at 1035. 
60 !d. at 1033-36; First National City Bank, 396 F.2d at 902-03. 
61 See In re Sealed, 825 F.2d at 498-99. The district court found a bank and the 
manager of the bank's branch in "Country Y" in contempt for failing to respond to a 
grand jury subpoena order. The bank and its manager claimed that they failed to comply 
with the subpoena out of fear of Country V's secrecy laws. The circuit court, reasoning 
that the manager could only be punished by Country V's authorities if he voluntarily 
returned to the foreign country, affirmed the contempt order against him. The court 
reversed the contempt order against the bank. It found that the subpoena required a 
foreign person to violate the laws of another foreign sovereign on that sovereign's own 
territory. Id. at 497. The court also considered that the bank was merely a third party 
and not the focus of the criminal investigation. !d. at 498. 
62 See United States v. Rubin, 836 F.2d 1096, 1101-02 (8th Cir. 1988) (court adopted 
Restatement (Second) factor analysis, finding Cayman Islands' interests in preserving 
privacy rights exceed U.S. interests); United States v. Vetco, 644 F.2d 1324, 1330-33 (9th 
Cir. 1981) (court, applying primarily Restatement (Second), held that enforcement of a 
U.S. statute against U.S. citizens outweighed Swiss interest in protecting identity of non-
consenting domiciliary); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 
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The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, has repeatedly re-
fused to consider the international comity concerns of the Second 
Circuit's analysis. 63 In United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia (Nova 
Scotia /), a bank was requested to produce certain records situated 
in its Antiguan and Bahamanian branches concerning a legal 
proceeding to which it was not a party.64 The bank refused on 
the grounds that production would violate Bahamanian secrecy 
laws.65 The court, without explanation, decided that U.S. interests 
far outweighed Bahamanian interests.66 The court did not deter-
mine the existence of any real threat of criminal sanctions against 
the bank.51 The court in Nova Scotia I did not even consider 
factors such as the neutrality of the bank and its status as a non-
party to the suit.68 
In a subsequent case involving the Bank of Nova Scotia, the 
same court completely disregarded a statement submitted by a 
foreign government delineating its interest in upholding its se-
crecy laws.69 The court reasoned that a bank operating in the 
United States must abide by U.S. laws regardless of the foreign 
interest at stake. 70 
The Seventh Circuit took a different approach to the analysis 
of obstacles to extraterritorial discovery. It considered one factor 
the Eleventh Circuit did not. In United States v. First National Bank 
F.2d 992, 997-99 (10th Cir. 1977) (court of appeals reversed district court's contempt 
order for failure of Delaware corporation to produce documents in Canada because such 
action might violate Canadian criminal law; 10th Circuit held as matter of comity West-
inghouse's need for evidence was not critical enough to overcome Canada's interest in 
enforcing its own explicit statute). 
63 See Nova Scotia 1,691 F.2d 1384, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 
(1983); United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817, 828 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1985) [hereinafter Nova Scotia II]. 
64 Nova Scotia 1,691 F.2d at 1386. In Nova Scotia I, a federal grand jury conducting a 
tax and narcotics investigation issued a subpoena duces tecum upon a branch of a Canadian 
bank in Miami, Florida. The subpoena required the bank's branches in Antigua and the 
Bahamas to produce certain records. The bank refused to produce the documents on the 
grounds that it would violate Bahamian secrecy law. The bank suggested that the U.S. 
government could instead seek judicial assistance from the Supreme Court of the Baha-
mas. The bank also argued it was unfair to require a mere investor to incur criminal 
liability in the Bahamas. Id. at 1386-88. 
65 Id. at 1388. 
66 Id. at 1391. 
67 Id. at 1389. 
68 See generally id. at 1386-91. 
69 Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d 817, 829-32 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 
(1985). 
70 Id. at 828. 
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of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit recognized that the party against 
whom discovery was sought was not a party to the suit. 71 The 
court found that it was fundamentally unfair to hold a non-party 
witness to the same standard as an actual party facing foreign 
criminal liabilities. 72 The court also showed greater consideration 
of the potential repercussions of complying with foreign law.73 
As the case law indicates, resolution of conflicts of law questions 
in the area of extraterritorial discovery varies not only by circuit, 
but even within the same circuit. Results may vary as courts take 
different factors into consideration and subject them to inconsis-
tent interpretation. Even in those cases where the conflict is re-
solved in favor of U.S. law, there is still a chance that compliance 
with U.S. law will not occur. Thus, courts are often able only to 
enforce sanctions on persons or objects directly under their ter-
ritorial jurisdiction. The SEC, if it is to successfully investigate 
and gather evidence in cases where foreign laws apply, must turn 
to other means of evidence gathering. These other means are 
discussed below. 
II. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND THE REGULATION OF 
SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS 
The SEC has turned to treaties and agreements between the 
United States and other nations in order to remove foreign ob-
stacles to extraterritorial discovery. These treaties and agreements 
provide for mutual assistance in cases involving securities and 
SEC investigations. 74 Additionally, the SEC has sought to use 
multilateral treaties such as the Hague Convention on the Taking 
of Evidence Abroad,75 and other more traditional methods such 
71 United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1983). 
72 Id. The court held that the defendant bank had established that Greek bank secrecy 
laws would apply where the Internal Revenue Service had requested disclosure of certain 
records held by a branch of the bank in Athens, Greece. The court stated that the case 
did not involve vital U.S. interests or the grand jury process, and, after balancing the 
Restatement (Second) § 40 factors, found in favor of the bank. /d. at 346-47. 
73 Id. at 346. 
74 Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 58, 70-73. 
75 For a discussion of the use of the Hague Convention, see John M. Fedders, Policing 
Internationalized U.S. Capital Markets: Methods to Obtain Evidence Abroad, 18 INT'L LAW. 89, 
93-100 (1984). The author states: 
There are two Hague Conventions which may be of assistance to the SEC in 
cases involving foreign persons or entities. The convention concerning "Service 
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents" was completed in 1965, and entered 
into force in the United States in 1969. Although in principle the convention 
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as letters rogatory.76 The SEC has entered into agreements with 
foreign securities agencies providing for the exchange of infor-
mation on alleged securities violations.77 Many of these treaties 
and agreements specifically address the extraterritorial discovery 
and conflicts of law problems.78 More recent accords, however, 
also address broader issues of market regulation.79 
A. Mutual Assistance Treaties 
The United States has entered into several bilateral treaties 
with foreign nations to provide mutual assistance in criminal 
matters.80 The SEC has worked to ensure that all these agree-
ments specifically cover conduct which is illegal under U.S. se-
curities laws.8l The SEC may utilize these treaties for the pro-
duction of information in an investigation or during a judicial 
proceeding, such as discovery, which may eventually lead to crim-
inal proceedings.82 
provides for the discovery of testimony and documents, many of the signatories 
have conditioned their assent to the convention with the reservation that no "pre-
trial" discovery may take place. Others have refused to grant any document 
production under the convention. The convention concerning "Taking of Evi-
dence Abroad" was completed in 1970, and ratified by the United States in 1972. 
This convention can provide assistance in obtaining evidence. Given the nature 
of the commission's proceedings, however, it has been employed rarely .... 
Id. at 99-100. 
76 The use of letters rogatory in this context is described in Fedders, supra note 75, at 
99: 
The [SEC] rarely makes formal requests by means of letters rogatory for 
assistance from a U.S. federal court to an appropriate foreign court. Letters 
rogatory are of limited use. As is true with respect to rule 37 requests, a matter 
must be pending before a u.s. district court before letters rogatory may be used. 
Most often, foreign cooperation is needed to complete an investigation prior to 
commencing such a lawsuit. Finally, letters rogatory may take considerable time, 
and there is no assurance that a foreign court can, or will, comply with the 
request .... 
77 Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 3-5, 73-88. 
78 See id. at 58-88. 
79 Id. at 91-92. 
80 See, e.g., Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, U.S.-
Switz., 27 U.S.T. 2019 [hereinafter Swiss Treaty]; Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance, 
June 12, 1981, U.S.-Neth., T.I.A.S. No. 10,734 [hereinafter Dutch Treaty]. These treaties 
cover a variety of crimes. Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 58. They are designed to assist 
the signatory nations in enforcing their criminal laws in spite of jurisdictional and en-
forcement problems that arise in international cases. Treaties are also in effect with the 
Commonwealth of the Bahamas, Canada, the Cayman Islands, Italy, and Turkey. Id. In 
addition, the United States has ratified agreements with Belgium, Colombia, Mexico, 
Morocco, and Thailand. The United States and the signatory nations have not yet ex-
changed instruments of ratification for those treaties. Id. 
81 Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 58. 
82 Id. 
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The Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between 
the Swiss Confederation and the United States (Swiss Treaty)83 
was the first mutual assistance treaty which the United States 
invoked.84 Recourse to the Swiss Treaty is available only for the 
governments of the United States and Switzerland.85 Except for 
cases involving organized crime, the offenses investigated under 
the Swiss Treaty must be considered crimes under both the re-
questing and the requested state's laws.86 Thus, the SEC may use 
the Swiss Treaty during an investigation only if the matter inves-
tigated is a potential violation of both U.S. and Swiss laws that 
could lead to a criminal proceeding. 87 
The Swiss Treaty also limits assistance under other provisions.88 
If the person about whom information is sought is unconnected 
with the offense, or the secret itself is of special importance to a 
Swiss interest, assistance may be denied.89 Assistance may also be 
refused if evidence is requested for the purpose of prosecuting 
a person for acts of which he or she was acquitted in the requested 
state.90 
Until recently, SEC recourse to the Swiss Treaty was unavailable 
for insider trading cases.91 When the United States and Switzer-
land first enacted the Treaty, Switzerland had few securities laws, 
covering only limited and highly specific circumstances.92 Fur-
"' Swiss Treaty, supra note 80. 
S< See SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock, and Call Options 
for the Common Stock of Santa Fe International Corp., [1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 99,424 (S.D.N.¥. July 25, 1983) [hereinafter Santa Fe]. 
85 Swiss Treaty, supra note 80, at arts. 1,2. 
86 Id. at art. 4. 
87 Id. Under the Swiss Treaty, a request is handled between central authorities: the 
U.S. Justice Department and the Swiss Justice and Police Department. If a request is 
made to the United States, the U.S. Justice Department determines whether the Treaty 
applies. The Swiss government has passed legislation creating rights of appeal for private 
individuals wishing to contest U.S. requests under the Treaty. Id. at arts. 4, 8. See also 
Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 60-61. 
88 See Swiss Treaty, supra note 80, at arts. 3, 5. Article 5 is the result of a disagreement 
between the United States and Switzerland regarding the use of information acquired 
under the Swiss Treaty. The U.S. view is that such information should be made available 
for all uses, while the Swiss feel that information acquired under the Treaty should be 
used solely for the purpose for which it was furnished. Article 5 incorporates the Swiss 
viewpoint with certain exceptions. Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 60. 
89 Swiss Treaty, supra note 80, at arts. 3, 5. 
90 Id. 
91 Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 62. Prior to 1988, insider trading violations were 
punishable only as an unlawful use of business secrets in violation of Article 162 of the 
Swiss Penal Code. Id. at 77. 
92 Id. at 62, 63. 
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thermore, Switzerland did not have any laws criminalizing insider 
trading.93 As a result, the SEC could seldom satisfy the dual 
criminality requirement of the Swiss Treaty.94 
Similar to the Swiss Treaty are the Treaty on Mutual Legal 
Assistance between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
United States (Dutch Treaty),95 and the Treaty between the 
United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland Concerning the Cayman Islands Relating to 
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (Cayman Treaty).96 
These treaties do not, however, provide a specific list of common 
offenses or contain a dual criminality requirement.97 Under the 
treaties, evidence may not be used for purposes other than those 
specified in the request, but the restriction may be waived by 
prior consent of the requested state.98 Under the Cayman Treaty, 
although there is no dual criminality requirement, the conduct 
must be punishable by more than one year imprisonment under 
either U.S. or Cayman Islands law before assistance will be 
granted.99 
The Treaty between the Government of Canada and the 
United States on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 
(Canadian Treaty),IOO goes a step further than the Cayman 
Treaty. It not only drops the dual criminality requirement,101 but 
also provides automatic assistance for violations of specific U.S. 
and Canadian securities laws. 102 Furthermore, under the Cana-
93 [d. at 77. Switzerland's Insider Trading Law became effective on July 1, 1988. This 
law, embodied in Article 161 of the Swiss Penal Code, expanded the scope of Article 162 
by providing for a greater number of situations for which insider trading can be prose-
cuted. The new law makes unlawful the use, for personal gain, of confidential information 
regarding the issuance of new securities, mergers, and acquisitions, by persons acting in 
their capacity as insiders or by tippees of such persons. [d. at 78. 
94 See Santa Fe, supra note 84, ~ 99,424. 
95 Dutch Treaty, supra note 80. 
96 Treaty Concerning the Cayman Islands and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal 
Matters, July 3, 1986, U.S.-U.K., 26 I.L.M. 536 [hereinafter Cayman Treaty]. 
97 See supra notes 95, 96. 
98 Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 70, 72. 
99 Cayman Treaty, supra note 96, at art. 3. 
100 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 18, 1985, U.S.-Can., 
24 I.L.M. 1092 [hereinafter Canadian Treaty]. 
101 Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 71. Similarly, a treaty between the United States 
and the Bahamas provides for assistance in cases involving conduct considered a crime 
under both U.S. and Bahamian law, or punishable as a crime under the laws of the 
requesting state by at least one year's imprisonment. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance 
in Criminal Matters, Aug. 18, 1987, U.S.-Bah., Sen. Treaty Doc. 100-17. 
102 Canadian Treaty, supra note 100, at annex. 
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dian Treaty there is virtually no limit on the use of the evidence 
obtained. 103 
Treaties establishing mutual assistance in criminal matters have 
provided substantial help in gathering extraterritorial evi-
dence.104 These treaties, however, cover a wide range of crimes 
of which securities fraud constitutes only a small portion. 105 In-
voking these treaties may be time-consuming and unhelpful to 
the SEC where the securities laws of the foreign nation are not 
comparable to U.S. laws. In particular, the SEC is unable to use 
such treaties where the alleged securities violation is only a civil 
offense in the United States. 106 
In response to these problems, the SEC has enacted mutual 
assistance agreements with its foreign counterparts. 107 These as-
sistance agreements, discussed below, are specifically tailored to 
the needs of each securities regulatory agency. Therefore, they 
tend to be more efficient and effective than treaties. 
B. Inter-Agency Memoranda of Understanding 
The SEC's alternative to the sometimes cumbersome and lll-
effective procedures provided by treaties in the area of evidence 
gathering has been the MOU.108 MOUs provide for the sharing 
of information and the cooperation between the SEC and foreign 
securities agencies in investigation and litigation. 109 Unlike trea-
ties, MOUs are non-binding agreements between like-minded 
regulators intended to facilitate mutual assistance in the area of 
securities law enforcement. lIo Unlike some of the bilateral trea-
103 Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 71. 
104 See id. at 58-72. 
105 [d. 
106 [d. at 58. 
107 [d. at 73, 74. 
108 Bornstein & Dugger, supra note 2, at 414. The SEC has also sought to help other 
nations revise or update their securities laws in order to create greater homogeneity in 
the international exchange market and to facilitate the use of existing mutual assistance 
treaties and MOUs. 
109 [d. at 413-17. 
110 [d. at 413-14. To date, the SEC has entered into MOUs with Brazil, Canada, France, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Mann & Mari, supra note 
46, at 73. The SEC has also entered into a more limited understanding with the Italian 
Commissione Nazionale per Ie Societa e la Borsa, which expresses the signatories' intention 
to cooperate in securities matters. Communique on Exchange of Information with the 
Commissione Nazionale per Ie Societa e la Borsa, Sept. 20, 1989, 44 SEC Docket 1319, 
cited in Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 73, 86. 
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ties, MOUs do not require the subject matter of the requested 
information to be an offense in both countries. II I MOUs are a 
practical approach to obtaining assistance, and requests are usu-
ally processed quickly.112 
The SEC enacted its first MOU in 1982. The Memorandum of 
Understanding between the United States and Switzerland (Swiss 
MOU) resulted from problems relating to the limited use of the 
Swiss Treaty in insider trading and civil cases.ll3 The Swiss MOU 
provided for the establishment of a separate agreement with the 
Swiss Bankers Association, known as Convention XVI, which 
created a procedure for disclosure of certain requested infor-
mation. 1I4 Convention XVI was terminated in 1988 when Swit-
zerland passed laws to regulate insider trading. 1I5 Although no 
longer in effect, the Swiss MOU has been extremely useful to the 
SEC in the gathering of evidence and could be used as a model 
for other M 0 U s. 116 
The Memorandum of Understanding between the SEC, the 
Ontario Securities Commission, Commission de Valeurs Mobi-
lieres du Quebec, and the British Columbia Securities Commis-
sion (Canadian MOU)1I7 and the Memorandum of Understand-
ing between the SEC and the Brazil Comissao de Valores 
Mobiliaros (Brazil MOU)IIB represent the most comprehensive 
MOUs to date. 1I9 They provide coverage for a wider range of 
activities than previous MOUS.120 Under the Canadian and Bra-
zilian MOUs, the signatory nations may assist in investigations 
III See Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 74-86. 
112 !d. at 74. 
113 See Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means for 
Improving International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the Field of Insider Trading, 
Aug. 31, 1982, U.S.-Switz., 22 I.L.M. 1. 
114 Agreement XVI of the Swiss Bankers' Association With Regard to the Handling of 
Requests for Information From the SEC on the Subject of the Misuse of Inside Infor-
mation, Aug. 31, 1982,22 I.L.M. 7. See also Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 75-76. 
115 Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 74, 77-78. 
116 [d. at 74. See, e.g., SEC v. Katz, No. 86 Civ. 6088 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
117 Memorandum of Understanding on Administration and Enforcement of Securities 
Laws, U.S.-Can., jan. 7,1988, 271.L.M. 410. 
118 Memorandum of Understanding Between the SEC and the Brazil Comissao De 
Valores Mobiliarios, july 1, 1988,43 SEC Docket 206; see Mann & Mari, supra note 46, 
at 81. 
119 See Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 78-81. 
120 !d. 
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and help disclose information relating to specified securities vio-
lations. 121 
Its success with MOUs in discovery matters has led the SEC to 
formulate other international agreements with even broader 
scope. 122 The latest agreements fashioned by the SEC go beyond 
enforcement and are another step toward more effective regu-
lation of international securities transactions. 123 In particular, the 
SEC has concluded stricter and more dependable mutual assis-
tance agreements, and multilateral accords for the general reg-
ulation of the international securities markets. 124 
C. Other Enforcement Agreements 
The Commission des Operations de Bourse (COB), France's 
securities regulatory agency, recently signed an agreement-the 
"French Understanding" (Understanding)-with the SEC.125 The 
Understanding goes well beyond previous bilateral agreements 
and represents a significant advance in international cooperation 
in securities matters. 126 In the Understanding, the SEC and the 
COB agreed upon the need for a framework to enhance com-
munications in all matters relating to operations of securities 
markets. 127 The Understanding represents the first formal ar-
rangement between the SEC and a foreign securities authority 
dealing with matters beyond the enforcement of securities laws. 128 
The SEC has also signed a trilateral understanding with Japan 
and the United Kingdom. 129 The SEC, the United Kingdom's 
Department of Trade and Industry, and Japan's Securities Bu-
n~au of the Ministry of Finance signed a Communique pledging 
cooperation among its signatories. 130 In the Communique, the 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 91-lO4. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 SEC Signs Assistance Pacts with France, the Netherlands, 3 Int'I Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 
No.2, at 1 (jan. 3, 1990) available in LEXIS, Nexis library, ISRR file. 
126 Id. at 3. 
127 Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 82. 
128 Id. 
129 Trilateral Communique on Cooperation between the SEC, the U.K. Department of 
Trade and Industry and Securities and Investments Board, and the Securities Bureau of 
the Ministry of Finance of Japan, Int'l ReI. No. 159 (Oct. I, 1990), cited in Mann & Mari, 
supra note 46, at 87. 
130 Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 87. 
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three agencies state their intention to work toward better regu-
lation of international stock markets. 131 
The SEC, as a member of the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), recently participated in draw-
ing up a new accord on cooperation. 132 The new accord calls for 
the negotiation of mutual assistance treaties among member na-
tions of IOSCO and for the enactment of legislation to support 
the treaties. 133 These international agreements demonstrate that 
the SEC has made significant progress in its regulation of inter-
national securities transactions. In order to continue this fast-
paced progress, however, it became necessary for Congress to 
pass legislation to facilitate the SEC's regulatory authority over 
international securities transactions. Congress responded to this 
need with ISECA. 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT 
COOPERATION ACT OF 1990 
A. Background 
The United States has enacted legislation amending its securi-
ties laws to prevent the impairment of SEC regulation of inter-
national securities transactions. This legislation allows the SEC 
greater latitude in complying with existing MOUs and in entering 
into more forceful and binding ones. 134 The legislation is embod-
ied in section 6 of the Insider Trading Fraud Enforcement Act 
of 1988 (ITSFEA)135 and in ISECA.136 
ISECA was first introduced in Congress as the International 
Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1988.137 The 1988 
version of the bill included four provisions. First, it granted the 
J3I Id. 
132 Id. at 87-88. 
133 Accord on Cooperation Among International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions (IOSCO) Membership, 45 SEC Docket 168, cited in Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 
87-88. In November 1986, the Executive Committee of IOSCO adopted a SEC proposal 
on cooperation among the securities agencies of all nations ratifying the proposal. The 
SEC formally ratified the adopted proposal on March 18, 1987, and 22 other Member 
States have ratified it to date. Mann & Mari, supra note 46, at 87-88. 
134 See generally ISECA, supra note 1. 
135 See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-704, § 6, 102 Stat. 4677, 4681 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(2) (Supp. 
1991)) [hereinafter ITSFEA). 
136 ISECA, supra note 1. 
137 H. R. REp. No. 240, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 20-23, (Oct. 25, 1990), reprinted in 1990 
U .S.C.C.A.N. 3888, 3895 [hereinafter Legislative History). 
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SEC legal authority to invoke its investigative powers on behalf 
of a foreign governmental authority. Second, it permitted the 
SEC to assure confidential treatment for records received from 
foreign agencies as a result of a mutual assistance agreement. 
Third, it clarified the SEC's rulemaking authority regarding ac-
cess to SEC documents by foreign and domestic officials. Finally, 
the 1988 bill enabled the SEC and other self-regulatory organi-
zations (SROs) to institute administrative proceedings against any 
broker or other professional dealing in securities, based upon a 
foreign court's finding that the broker or other professional en-
gaged in illegal conduct. 138 
The 100th Congress enacted only the first provision of the 
1988 bill, as part of ITSFEA.139 That provision, section 6 of 
ITSFEA, permits the SEC to provide foreign securities authorities 
with assistance in investigating possible violations of foreign se-
curities laws. 14o It requires the SEC to take two factors into ac-
count in deciding whether to provide assistance to a requesting 
foreign authority. The SEC must determine whether the request-
ing authority has agreed to provide the SEC with reciprocal as-
sistance in securities matters. 141 The SEC must also determine 
that compliance with the request would not prejudice the public 
interest of the United States. 142 
The three remaining provisions of the 1988 bill were reintro-
duced, along with two new provisions, as ISECA. 143 First, ISECA 
empowered SROs, such as stock exchanges, to exclude persons 
convicted of a felony from membership in the organization. Sec-
ond, the legislation authorized the SEC to accept reimbursement 
for expenses incurred during investigations done on behalf of 
foreign securities authorities. 144 The bill became law on Novem-
ber 15, 1990. 145 
138 [d. H.R. 1396, ISECA, was substantially similar in scope to H.R. 4945, the 1988 
version of the bill. Compare H.R. 4945, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1988) with H.R. 1396, IOlst 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1990). 
139 See ITSFEA, supra note 135; see also Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3895. 
140 ITSFEA, supra note 135. 
141 [d. 
142 [d. The SEA states that the SEC may provide assistance at the request of a foreign 
authority if the authority states that it is conducting an investigation which is necessary 
to determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or is about to violate any laws 
or rules relating to securities matters which the authority administers or enforces. [d. 
143 Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3895-907. 
144 [d. at 3908-1l. 
145 ISECA, Pub. L. No. 101-550, 104 Stat. 2714 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.) (Supp. 1991). 
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B. Provisions of ISECA 
ISECA's general purpose is to strengthen international coop-
eration in the enforcement of both foreign and domestic securi-
ties laws. 146 It amends the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
(SEA), the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA), and the 
Investment Adviser Act of 1940 (IAA) in several ways to achieve 
its goal of increased international cooperation. 147 Each provision 
of ISECA addresses a perceived problem in the international 
regulation and enforcement of securities laws. 148 
There are four key provisions of ISECA. The first provision 
exempts confidential documents received from foreign authori-
ties from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA)149 and other laws under certain conditions. 150 The second 
provision makes explicit the SEC's rulemaking authority to pro-
vide non-public documents and other information to domestic 
and foreign law enforcement officials. 151 The third provision 
grants the SEC and SROs explicit authority to bar, suspend, or 
place limitations on securities professionals based upon the find-
ings of a foreign court or foreign securities authority that such 
persons committed specified types of violations. 152 The final pro-
146 Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3889. In the House Report, the SEC views 
the main purpose of ISECA as "enhanc[ing] the ability of the [SEC] to prevent and detect 
violations of V.S. securities laws that are committed at least in part abroad and whose 
investigation may require the SEC to obtain substantial foreign-based evidence." [d. 
147 /d. at 2715-21. 
148 Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3911-22. 
149 Freedom of Information Act, 5 V.S.C.S. § 552 (Law. Co-op. 1966) [hereinafter 
FOIA]. 
150 ISECA, 15 V.S.C.A. § 78x(d); see also Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3910-
12. 
151 ISECA, 15 V.S.C.A. § 78x(c); see also Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3912-
14. 
152 ISECA, 15 V.S.C.A. § 780(b)(4); see also Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3914-
20. ISECA also authorizes SROs, to prohibit any person convicted of a felony from 
becoming a member of the organization or associating with a member. A SRO may also 
place conditions on membership or association. ISECA, 15 V.S.C.A. § 78c(b)(6); see also 
Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3914-20. The SEA provides self-regulatory orga-
nizations (SROs), subject to SEC scrutiny, the right to disqualify persons convicted of 
specified felonies and misdemeanors from membership with the SRO or participation or 
association with an SRO member. 15 V.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(39). The section of ISECA which 
amends § 3(a)39 of the SEA, provides that a person is subject to statutory disqualification 
with respect to membership, or association with a member of a SRO if said person is an 
ex-felon, regardless of the nature of the felony. ISECA, 15 V.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(39)(F). 
ISECA also expands the grounds on which SROs can deny persons membership, or 
association with members of the SRO in two ways: I) by including certain foreign disci-
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VISIon authorizes the SEC to accept reimbursement for investi-
gatory expenses incurred while providing assistance to foreign 
government authorities. 153 These provisions are examined below. 
1. FOIA Exemption 
Pursuant to certain MOUs reached between the SEC and for-
eign authorities, documents which would normally be confidential 
under the laws of a foreign authority may still be obtained by the 
SEC.154 The underlying policy is that governmental use of oth-
erwise confidential documents should be permitted for the pros-
ecution of securities law violators.155 A problem could arise, how-
ever, when the SEC decides not to prosecute the violators. Under 
such circumstances FOIA could be used to compel the SEC to 
disclose information it obtained from foreign securities sources 
as "records obtained from other sources."156 The SEC's inability 
to ensure the confidentiality of furnished documents not used in 
the prosecution of a securities law violator could inhibit foreign 
securities agencies' compliance with certain MOU provisions. 
Moreover, foreign securities agencies may be precluded by their 
domestic laws from engaging in mutual assistance agreements, 
such as MOUs, which do not explicitly provide for the protection 
of confidential information. 157 
To remedy this potential problem, ISECA provides for a FOIA 
exemption for certain information acquired from foreign 
sources. 158 Under the exemption, the SEC may withhold from 
disclosure documents obtained from foreign securities agencies 
if the foreign authority has represented to the SEC, in good faith, 
plinary actions; and 2) by amending subparagraph F of § 3(a)39 of SEA to include "any 
other felony" to the list of crimes warranting special review. Id. Subparagraph F permits 
the SRO, as well as the SEC, to provide special scrutiny of persons convicted of felonies 
not previously enumerated under the SEA. Subparagraph F does not imply an automatic 
exclusion from the securities business for any convicted felon. Rather, it permits SROs, 
subject to SEC review, to consider the facts of each particular case. See Legislative History, 
supra note 137, at 3916-20. 
153 ISECA, 15 V.S.C.A. § 78d; see also Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3920-21. 
154 ISECA, 15 V.S.C.A. § 78x(c); see also Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3910-
12. 
155 Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3910-12. 
156 Id. FOIA obligates the SEC to disclose documents acquired from any source, in-
cluding foreign securities agencies, unless they fall under a particular FOIA exemption. 
Id. at 3910. 
157 Id. at 3910. 
158 Id. at 3911-12. 
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that public disclosure of such records would be contrary to the 
laws of the foreign country.159 The SEC must also show that it 
obtained such records pursuant to procedures similar to those it 
would use in connection with the enforcement or administration 
of U.S. securities laws or through an established MOU.160 
In its proposal for the legislation, the SEC noted that the ex-
emption would, in no way, undermine the purpose of FOIA.161 
Indeed, the absence of a FOIA exemption would preclude var-
ious foreign securities agencies from entering into MOUs and, 
therefore, no confidential information would be available for 
disclosure through FOIA.162 Thus, the exemption would not af-
fect the number of documents subject to FOIA disclosure. 163 In 
sum, foreign agencies are likely to be more cooperative in up-
holding existing MOUs and entering into new mutual assistance 
agreements once document confidentiality is assured. 164 
2. Rulemaking Authority 
Another problem ISECA addresses concerns the disclosure of 
information between the SEC and foreign securities authorities. 
The problem arises when the SEC holds information deemed 
confidential under FOIA and not subject to disclosure. 165 Under 
the SEC's Rules of Practice, the Division of Enforcement Director 
is authorized to provide access to non-public information in the 
SEC's investigative files to domestic and foreign government au-
thorities, SROs and other specified persons. 166 In addition, des-
159 ISECA, IS U.S.C.A. § 78x(d). 
160 [d. ISECA adds a new subsection (e) to § 24 of the SEA which lists certain "savings 
provisions" regarding the confidentiality of disclosures allowed by ISECA. [d. § 78x(e). 
First, the new legislation does not change the certification and notice requirements of the 
Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA), as limited by § 21(h) of the SEA with respect to 
transfers of records. Under § 1112(a) of the RFPA, the SEC may not transfer to other 
federal agencies financial records obtained through RFPA procedures without written 
certification that the records are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry within 
the jurisdiction of the receiving agency or department. Second, the section does not 
prevent the SEC from complying with an information request from Congress or an order 
from a U.S. court in an action commenced by the SEC or the United States. [d. 
161 Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3910. 
162 [d. 
163 /d. 
164 [d. 
165 [d. at 3912-14. 
166 17 C.F.R. 202.S(b) (1990), cited in Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3912 n.6. 
There are several other rules and regulations allowing access to otherwise confidential 
information. For example, Administrative Regulation 19-I(I)(b) provides that "the pro-
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ignated members of the SEC staff are permitted to "engage in 
discussions" concerning non-public documents with persons spec-
ified by the Rules of Practice. 167 
In 1975, Congress amended the SEA to limit access to non-
public information. 168 The literal language of amended SEA sec-
tion 24(b) called for documents not to be disclosed if deemed 
confidential under FOIA.169 The legislative history accompanying 
the amendment, however, indicates that it was intended only to 
ensure that all requests for confidential treatment of information 
be subject to FOIA rules and not preclude disclosure of certain 
non-public documents. 170 
In general, the SEC receives an access request before the staff 
makes a confidential treatment determination, and the problem 
posed by the broad interpretation of section 24(b) is not at is-
sue. l7l Occasionally, however, it can pose a serious obstacle to the 
SEC's ability to comply with foreign authorities' requests for in-
formation. 172 ISECA gives full discretion to the SEC in the guise 
of rulemaking authority. 173 This authority grants flexibility to the 
SEC in adjusting its access rules in the future. 174 Specifically, the 
legislation gives the SEC general rule making authority to grant 
access to records in its possession to both domestic and foreign 
persons, as long as they provide appropriate assurances of con-
fidentiality.175 The provision ensures that the SEC will not provide 
hibition[s] against the use of non-public information or documents" imposed by various 
[SEC] rules do "not apply to the use of such materials as necessary or appropriate by 
members of the [SEC] in pursuing [SEC] investigations, examinations or in discharge of 
other official responsibilities." Administrative Regulation 19-1(1)(b), SEC 19-1(1)(b) cited 
in Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3912 n.6. 
167 17 C.F.R. 203.2, cited in Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3912 n.6. 
168 Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3913-14. 
169 Id. FOlA sections Band C provide certain guidelines for government agencies to 
determine whether documents and records should be deemed confidential and not subject 
to mandatory disclosure. See FOlA, 5 V.S.C. § 552(b)-(c). 
170 Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3913. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. Other statutory provisions may create similar problems inhibiting the SEC's 
ability to grant access to information. Section 21O(b) of the lAA, supra note 23, prohibits 
the SEC staff from making public any information obtained in an examination or inves-
tigation pursuant to that Act, unless expressly authorized by the SEC. Section 45(a) of 
the lCA, supra note 23, provides for a similar prohibition. Legislative History, supra note 
137, at 3913. 
173 lSECA, 15 V.S.C.A. § 78x(c); see also Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3913-
14. 
174 ISECA, 15 V.S.C.A. § 78x(c). 
175 Id. 
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records for purposes other than those stated in the access re-
quest. 176 MOUs usually specify the limitations placed on the use 
of furnished information. 177 ISECA supersedes the previous pro-
vision of the SEA which arguably precluded the disclosure of 
certain non-public documents. Thus, with the explicit authority, 
the SEC will be able to negotiate better MOUs. These MOUs will 
likely have more specific provisions on access to information. 
Additionally, foreign authorities will be inclined to reciprocate 
and provide similar provisions. 
3. Authority to Bar, Suspend, and Place Limitations on Se-
curities Professionals 
Another problem ISECA addresses is the growing tendency of 
the SEC to enforce judgments against violators of U.S. securities 
laws abroad. As the SEC steps up such enforcement, it will have 
to provide reciprocal treatment for foreign authorities who seek 
to enforce their own findings and judgments in the United 
States. 178 In some cases, foreign authorities may have little interest 
in enforcing their own securities laws or preventing a violator 
from participating in another country's securities markets. None-
theless, the SEC may still want to impose administrative sanctions 
against such professionals to control the increased foreign in-
vestment presence in the United States. 179. The SEA gave the 
SEC substantial authority to curtail the securities activities of 
certain convicted criminals and other wrongdoers for illegal or 
improper conduct in the United States. 180 The SEA, however, 
176 Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3914 n.9. SEC policy requires the requesting 
authority to state the purpose for which the solicited information will be used, and to 
certify that it will not be subject to public use except for the purpose specified. Where 
the SEC has entered into MOUs, it usually specifies the public use of information acquired 
through the MOUs. 
177 [d. 
178 [d. at 3914-20. 
179 [d. at 3915. There has been a dramatic increase in the number of U.S. investment 
companies that trade foreign securities. This increase has resulted in increased activity 
by broker-dealers, investment advisers, and other securities professionals in foreign mar-
kets. In addition, the activities of foreign professionals in U.S. markets has significantly 
increased. As a result, the SEC is likely to be faced with a growing number of professionals 
working in U.S. markets whom a foreign agency or court has found to have engaged in 
illegal or improper activities abroad. [d. at 3915 n.10. 
180 [d. at 3915. Under § 15(b)(4) and (b)(6) of the SEA, the SEC may censure; limit the 
activities, functions, or operations of; suspend for up to 12 months; revoke the registration 
of any broker or dealer; or bar from association with any broker or dealer; any person: 
(1) found to have violated the federal securities laws, rules, or regulations thereunder; 
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was silent on the SEC's authority to impose sanctions where the 
misconduct is based on foreign findings of foreign law viola-
tions. ISI ISECA authorizes the SEC, based upon findings of a 
foreign court or securities authority to censure, revoke the reg-
istration of, or impose employment restrictions upon securities 
professionals registered to do business in the United States. IS2 
This new authorization clarifies the scope of the SEC's punitive 
power which was arguably limited to illegal and improper activity 
in the United States. 1S3 Although it was once possible for profes-
sionals having violated foreign securities laws to escape SEC re-
view, now any professional having violated equivalent U.S. secu-
rities laws will be subject to SEC scrutiny.ls4 In addition, the SEC 
now has explicit authority to consider convictions by a foreign 
court of competent jurisdiction for certain non-securities related 
crimes as a basis for imposing sanctions against securities profes-
sionals. ls5 With these provisions, the SEC can better monitor 
international securities markets by regulating their participants. 
4. Reimbursement 
Just as it is important to provide the SEC with the authority to 
cooperate with foreign securities agencies, it is essential to make 
such authority practical. In order for the SEC to exercise properly 
(2) convicted of a "felony or misdemeanor" within the preceding ten years involving 
specified crimes; (3) who willfully has filed a false or misleading statement in any regis-
tration statement or report filed with the SEC; or (4) who has willfully aided or abetted 
a violation of any portion of the federal securities or commodities laws. [d. 
181 There are certain SEA provisions which the SEC can utilize to impose sanctions in 
such circumstances. See, e.g., lSECA, 15 V.S.C.A. §§ 7So, SOa. 
182 [d. The SEC may act on the finding of a foreign court, securities authority, or 
regulatory authority that a professional has made false or misleading statements or reports 
filed with the foreign authority; violated foreign statutory or regulatory provisions re-
garding securities and commodities transactions; and aided, abetted, or otherwise caused 
another to violate such statutory provision or failed to supervise a person who has violated 
such provisions. [d. § 7So(b)(4). lSECA also expands the list of offenses in the SEA to 
include any convictions by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction for any crime enum-
erated previously or a "substantially similarly equivalent" foreign activity. [d. 
§ 7So(b)(4)(B)(iii). 
18. [d. § 7So(b)(4). lSECA contains similar amendments to § 9(b) of the lCA and 
§ 203(e) of the lAA, regarding sanctions against investment advisors. lSECA adds to 
3(a)50 of the SEA a new subsection 5(1) which redefines the term foreign "financial 
regulatory authority." lSECA similarly expands the definitions of foreign financial regu-
latory authority and of foreign securities authority in both the lCA and the lAA. [d.; see 
also Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3919. 
184 Legislative History, supra note 137, at 39IS-20. 
185 [d. at 3917. 
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its authority, additional funds are necessary, especially in light of 
the potential increase in investigations, evidence-producing pro-
cedures, and general administrative work. ISECA provides for 
full reimbursement to the SEC for any expenses incurred during 
investigations carried out on behalf of a requesting foreign au-
thority.186 
C. ISECA's Effectiveness as a Response to the Problem of 
Extraterritorial Discovery in U.S. Securities Cases 
Since the days of Societe Internationale, there has been an evo-
lution in extraterritorial discovery techniques under U.S. securi-
ties laws. This evolution has led the SEC away from relying on 
the application of domestic law by U.S. courts, and toward a policy 
of mutual agreements with foreign nations and government agen-
cies. Faced with the unsuccessful foreign application of U.S. se-
curities laws, the SEC first turned to the use of treaties providing 
for dual criminality laws. Later treaties were broader in scope 
and more flexible in application. As the need for even greater 
cooperation and specificity grew, the SEC turned to MOUs. Most 
recently, the SEC has entered into agreements which provide for 
even greater authority and discretion by regulatory agencies. 
The evolution in extraterritorial discovery techniques has been 
characterized by increased cooperation between the SEC and its 
foreign counterparts. The procedures and rules found in coop-
eration agreements are the result of negotiations among partici-
pating governments. This approach has proven effective, and 
satisfied principles of international comity. 
ISECA attempts to continue this approach. Its primary goal is 
to allow the SEC to better implement existing MOUs and enter 
into new and more effective agreements with its foreign counter-
parts. Congress believed that these steps would result in easier 
and more effective enforcement of U.S. securities laws in the 
international arena. 187 In the context, however, of facilitating 
extraterritorial discovery, there are limitations on ISECA's ability 
to continue to promote increased international cooperation. 
For example, under the first provision of ISECA, the SEC has 
the power to exempt from the disclosure requirements of FOIA 
certain documents and records acquired from foreign agencies. 
IS6 ISECA, 15 V.S.C.A. § 78d. 
IS7 Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3889. 
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In turn, the SEC expects these same foreign agencies to give 
increased access to heretofore undisclosed information. 188 Thus, 
the new guarantee of confidentiality would help remove obstacles 
to extraterritorial discovery. The FOIA exemption, however, is 
conditional. ISECA requires a showing of "good faith" by a for-
eign authority that public disclosure of the information would 
violate its national laws. 189 Presumably, the process of determining 
good faith is left in the hands of the SEC. It is thus conceivable 
that sensitive information given to the SEC by foreign authorities 
will not be FOIA-exempt. The good faith standard and possible 
public disclosure of information might dissuade foreign author-
ities from providing the information in the first place. 
In order for the SEC to exempt foreign information from 
FOIA disclosure, ISECA also requires the SEC to obtain the 
information pursuant to specified procedures. The procedures 
must be those the SEC would normally follow in enforcing U.S. 
securities laws through an existing MOU.190 This requirement 
might also inhibit cooperation by foreign authorities. Even if a 
foreign authority has satisfactorily demonstrated in good faith 
the need for confidentiality, a FOIA exemption may be denied 
where the SEC fails to follow proper procedures. 
ISECA's second provision seeks to complement the first by 
allowing the SEC to grant foreign agencies access to information 
that would normally be confidential under FOIA.191 The SEC 
expects that foreign agencies will reciprocate with broader disclo-
sure policies. 192 The rulemaking authority of the second provision 
gives the SEC discretion to release otherwise confidential infor-
mation if the requesting persons, domestic or foreign, assure that 
confidentiality will be maintained as determined by the SEC.193 
This condition poses difficulties similar to those of the first pro-
vision: it establishes an SEC-based decision-making process to 
which a foreign securities regulatory agency may be subject. 
ISECA's FOIA provisions were drafted in response to foreign 
concerns. 194 While this attentiveness does foster increased inter-
188 Id. at 3911-12. 
189 ISECA, 15 V.S.C.A. § 78x(d). 
190 !d. § 78x(d). 
191 See supra notes 149-64 and accompanying text. 
192 Id. 
193 See supra notes 165-77 and accompanying text. 
194 International Securities Enforcement: Hearing on H.R. 1396 Before the Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, lOlst Cong., 
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national cooperation, it does not reflect a true multinational co-
operative effort. ISECA does not provide for joint or multina-
tional cooperation in determining if and when documents will be 
disclosed. 195 
The third provision, granting the SEC and certain SROs the 
power to penalize securities professionals based on a foreign 
securities agency's or foreign court's authority, ostensibly serves 
to improve market regulation, not extraterritorial discovery.196 
Although this power can be useful in connection with the imple-
mentation of MOUs or enforcement agreements with other na-
tions, standing alone it has certain deficiencies. Unlike the SEC's 
power to limit the securities-related activities of persons convicted 
of a crime in the United States, this power is not as easily justified 
when applied to persons convicted of a crime by a foreign 
court. 197 
Until recently, foreign countries did not consider criminal vi-
olations of U.S. securities laws important enough to merit com-
mensurate treatment under their laws. As a result, the penalty 
and stigma associated with recently enacted securities laws in 
those countries may not be comparable to that of similar laws in 
the United States. It follows that sanctions imposed by the SEC 
would be disproportionate to the foreign crime. To a lesser de-
gree, this rationale also applies to the new provisions allowing 
the SEC to base sanctions on foreign convictions for non-securi-
ties related crimes. 
In both cases, the discretion of deciding when and where sanc-
tions will be imposed is left entirely to the SEC. Foreign author-
ities probably would want to participate in determining the pun-
ishment for violations of their laws by their nationals. For the 
SEC to regulate the securities market more effectively, it is im-
portant that U.S. criminal convictions be carried out in foreign 
1 st Sess. 79-83 (1989) (letter from David S. Ruder, SEC Chairman, to Rep. Edward J. 
Markey, Chairman, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance). In the letter, 
Chairman Ruder refers specifically to countries "A" and "B" which insisted upon assur-
ances of nondisclosure prior to providing the SEC with confidential documents. In ad-
dition, the letter notes that country B refused to sign any agreement providing for the 
exchange of documents unless Congress passed legislation containing a FOIA exemption. 
/d. at 81. 
195 See id. at 3913-14; see also supra text accompanying notes 166-76. 
196 See supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text. 
197 Legislative History, supra note 137, at 3915. The SEC already possesses substantial 
authority to restrict the securities activities of certain persons convicted of criminal charges 
in this country. 
1992] EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY 499 
courts. The SEC has a vested interest in how foreign governments 
treat U.S. convictions. If the foreign judgment carries with it only 
a minor penalty, restricted participation in the U.S. securities 
market may be unfair under the foreign law. 
ISECA's provisions also fail to take into account the basis for 
many foreign laws. Under ISECA, the SEC can assess the need 
for secrecy and confidentiality of foreign documents. ISECA, 
however, fails to consider that many foreign nations have differ-
ent notions of privacy. 198 Overlooking the cultural basis of foreign 
security requirements will be detrimental to international comity 
if obstacles to extraterritorial discovery such as foreign blocking 
and secrecy laws are examined strictly from a U.S. perspective. 
ISECA, on its own, could go further in increasing multinational 
cooperation in the area of enforcement of securities laws and 
extraterritorial discovery. More progress could be achieved by 
relying more heavily on treaty-like instruments which could en-
compass both the binding nature of treaties and the efficient and 
tailored attributes of MOUs. Such instruments are already taking 
shape in the international arena as the next generation of en-
forcement agreements are being formed between the United 
States and foreign nations. 199 Whatever legislation Congress 
passes to grant the SEC more discretionary powers in interna-
tional enforcement of U.S. securities violations, it should continue 
to allow the SEC greater leeway in entering new agreements with 
its foreign counterparts. Although ISECA purports in part to 
accomplish this goal, it sets up standards and requirements with-
out enough participation from those it affects: the governments 
of foreign nations. 
CONCLUSION 
The best way the SEC can achieve its goal of effective inter-
national regulation of U.S. securities transactions is to continue 
with the negotiation and implementation of mutual assistance 
agreements. Until recently these agreements primarily provided 
for assistance in the gathering of evidence. It is possible, however, 
to broaden the scope of such agreements to include assistance in 
matters of more general regulation such as registration, stock 
market controls, and greater enforcement of sanctions arising in 
198 Silets & Brenner, supra note 30, at 443-48. 
199 See supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text. 
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civil and criminal cases. For the SEC to accomplish these broader 
aims, it is necessary for Congress to give the agency the appro-
priate authority. 
Congress enacted ISECA in order to give the SEC the power 
necessary to implement existing mutual assistance agreements 
and enter into new, more expansive accords. It is important, 
however, to realize that ISECA alone is insufficient to meet the 
broader aims of international cooperation in securities laws. Al-
though ISECA provides the SEC important new discretionary 
powers, more can be done to increase cooperation in extraterri-
torial discovery. To make ISECA more effective, the SEC must 
continue to implement MOUs and other cooperation agreements, 
and replace unilaterally established procedures. Congress and the 
SEC should promote a multinational approach to improving ex-
traterritorial discovery. 
Philip O. Erwin 
